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ANTITRUST LAW-BERKEY PHOTO AND ALASKA AIRLINES: 
DIFFERENT ApPROACHES TO MONOPOLY LEVERAGING CLAIMS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1890 Congress enacted the Sherman Act! which sought to 
limit unlawful monopolies or any organizations which operate to 
restrict competition in the American economy.2 Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act generally applies to allegations of concerted conduct 
between two or more entities which results in anti-competitive 
practices.3 Section 2 also applies to concerted conduct, but more 
importantly, it is the only section in the Sherman Act which pro­
vides a remedy for monopoly violations caused by unilateral con­
duct. Section 2 condemns the following three categories of activity: 
monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and combining or con­
spiring to monopolize.4 As discussed in Section IB of this Note, the 
courts have defined these terms and expanded the definitions 
where appropriate. This Note focuses on the "monopolizing" and 
"attempting to monopolize" aspects of section 2 and evaluates 
whether monopoly leveraging is a type of "attempt" or a whole new 
offense. It ultimately examines whether monopoly leveraging5 
should be considered an offense under section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.6 
The first expressly stated offense under section 2 is monopoliz­
ing. To bring a successful monopolization claim, a plaintiff must 
1. 1 EARL KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 7 n.1.1 (1978). 
2. Id. at 11-12. 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id. 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony 
...." Id. 
5. Monopoly leveraging occurs when a competitor holds a lawful monopoly in 
one market and wields that monopoly power to gain a competitive advantage in a sepa­
rate market. See infra note 13. 
6. For another treatment of this issue, see Joseph M. Callow, Jr., Note, Cut­
Throat Competition in the Friendly Skies: Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 
536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Il2 S. Ct. 1603 (1992),61 U. CIN. L. REv. 681 (1992). 
111 

112 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:111 
prove "possession of monopoly power in the relevant market"? and 
"the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power"8 by the al­
leged monopolist. The relevant market is generally the market in 
which the plaintiff and defendant are competing. The scope or size 
of the relevant market (as determined by the court) is extremely 
important in determining whether a company possesses monopoly 
power.9 To be liable under the above formula, the actor must pos­
sess monopoly power in the specific relevant market and willfully 
acquire or maintain such power. 
An "[a]ttempt to monopolize" is the second expressly stated 
offense under the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court has set forth 
three elements to aid lower courts in defining an attempt to monop­
olize claim. First, the monopoly holder must intend to monopolize 
the relevant market.10 Second, the monopoly holder must engage 
in conduct that is designed to carry out such intent,u Third, not 
only must a plaintiff prove intent on the part of the allegedly unfair 
competitor, but also that a dangerous probability of success exists.12 
In addition to the explicit section 2 claims of monopolization 
and attempt to monopolize, this section also forms the basis for a 
line of cases developing the doctrine of "monopoly leveraging." 
"Leveraging" normally occurs when an entity possesses a monopoly 
in one market and uses that monopoly power to gain a competitive 
advantage in a separate market,13 Some courts have recognized 
7. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966). 
8. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added). 
9. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The 
Court had to determine whether cellophane constituted its own market or was part of a 
broader market for wrapping products. If the former market analysis was applied, Du­
Pont would have possessed monopoly power. The Court stated that "where there are 
market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their purposes, illegal monopoly 
does not exist merely because the produCt said to be monopolized differs from others. 
If it were not so, only physically identical products would be a part of the market." Id. 
at 394. 
10. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 n.28 
(1985) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 
1945». 
11. Id. The intent required for a successful "attempt" claim is specific whereas 
that required for a "monopolization" claim is the general intent to do the act. 
12. Brook Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578 
(1993); Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905); see also American 
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946) ("The phrase 'attempt to mo­
nopolize' means the employment of methods, means and practices which would, if suc­
cessful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though falling short, nevertheless 
approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of it ....") (emphasis added). 
13. See Barry E. Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize - Specific Intent as Antitrust's 
Ghost in the Machine, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 1121, 1156 (1973). "[T]he defendant has 
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monopoly leveraging as an offense under section 2 while other 
courts have held that leveraging does not conform to any of the 
enumerated offenses. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co. ,14 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit endorsed mo­
nopoly leveraging and noted its requirements. I5 Twelve years later 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Alaska Airlines, Inc. 
v. United Airlines, Inc., 16 became the first circuit court to openly 
refute the leveraging doctrine, setting the stage for the present 
controversyP 
This Note will attempt to resolve the controversy between 
these two circuits. Section I of this Note analyzes the legislative 
history behind the Sherman Act with particular emphasis on section 
2 of the Act as well as the cases prior to Berkey Photo. IS Section II 
will look at the Berkey Photo decision itself including Judge Kauf­
man's synthesis of the leveraging doctrine.19 The cases following 
Berkey Photo, especially the Supreme Court cases which influenced 
the Alaska Airlines court, are examined in Section lIFO Section IV 
presents the facts and analysis of the Alaska Airlines opinion.21 Fi­
nally, Section V explores the validity of the two approaches to mo­
nopoly leveraging, especially in light of recent Supreme Court 
precedent.22 This Note ultimately concludes that monopoly lever­
aging cannot constitute an offense under the Sherman Act. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Although previous cases had indicated the existence of the 
leveraging doctrine?3 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 24 
monopoly power in one of the markets or on one level of the distribution chain. A 
violation of section 2 occurs when this monopoly power is misused in a second market, 
usually to gain a competitive advantage through the leverage resulting from its domi­
nance in the primary monopoly market." [d. See also Louis Kaplow, Extension ofMo­
nopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 516 (1985). "Traditional 
leverage theory claims that a monopolist's use of its power in its own market to control 
activities in another market typically represents an attempt to spread its power to the 
other market." [d. 
14. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
15. [d. at 276. 
16. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). 
17. [d. at 547. 
18. See infra notes 23-73 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 76-110 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 111-42 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 143-85 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 186-263 and accompanying text. 
23. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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was the first case to clearly express25 the requirements for a monop­
oly leveraging claim.26 The Berkey Photo court held that "the use 
of monopoly power attained in one market to gain a competitive 
advantage in another market is a violation of section 2 [of the Sher­
man Act], even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize the 
second market. "27 Simply stated, under the monopoly leveraging 
theory, if a firm has a lawful monopoly28 in one market and uses it 
to gain some type of competitive advantage in a second market, the 
firm would be in violation of section 2 regardless of the lack of any 
intent to monopolize the second market. 
The monopoly leveraging rule articulated in Berkey Photo ar­
guably made it easier for a firm to fall within the violative scope of 
the Sherman Act. As mentioned above, monopoly power in the 
relevant shared market was traditionally required to complete a vi­
olation under the Sherman Act. The monopoly leveraging doctrine, 
however, created an offense for monopoly held outside the relevant 
market that merely influenced this secondary market.29 The lever­
aging doctrine moved away from the stricter requirements of the 
expressly stated section 2 offenses.3o Other cases had indicated that 
proceeding beyond the traditional offenses would facilitate the po­
licing of anti-competitive conduct,31 but Berkey Photo was the first 
case to express clearly the elements of the leveraging doctrine. 
The doctrine developed in Berkey Photo received considerable 
24. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
25. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). 
26. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275-76. 
27. Id. at 276. The Ninth Circuit, however, has taken issue with the "clearness" of 
this doctrine, stating disparagingly that the "doctrine has only two rather loose ele­
ments." Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 546. 
28. Lawful monopolies generally arise when a company, through superior skill 
and efficiency, gains a monopoly over competitors. See United States v. E.!. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956). The Court stated: 
A retail seller may have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade because of 
location, as an isolated country store or filling station, or because no one else 
makes a product of just the quality or attractiveness of his product, as for 
example in cigarettes. Thus one can theorize that we have monopolistic com­
petition in every nonstandardized commodity with each manufacturer having 
power over the price and production of his own product. However, this power 
... is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
29. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275-76. 
30. Id. 
31. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); United States v. Alu­
minum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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treatment in the courts of appeals and district courts.32 Some courts 
responded favorably to the doctrine33 while others decided to re­
serve judgment until a fact pattern presented itself that more 
closely fit the paradigm for leveraging.34 When the Court of Ap­
peals for the Ninth Circuit fmally spoke decisively upon the issue35 
in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.,36 it became the first 
circuit to reject the Berkey Photo doctrine.37 The Alaska Airlines 
court cited numerous policy considerations, which are discussed in 
detail later,38 as a justification for the holding. The Ninth Circuit 
also noted that the Berkey Photo methodology was overbroad be­
cause it exceeded the previously outlined traditional offenses. 
A. Legislative History 
The lawmakers who debated the Sherman Act never explicitly 
considered the doctrine of monopoly leveraging or many of the 
other doctrines which have subsequently developed under the Sher­
man Act. They were more concerned with the "big picture. "39 This 
fact, however, does not invalidate monopoly leveraging per se. In­
stead, monopoly leveraging must be examined in the context of the 
judicially created guidelines as sanctioned by Congress. 
Most laws enacted by Congress require some level of interpre­
tation by the courts to determine the meaning of specific language. 
The broad language of the Sherman Act, however, mandates even 
greater intervention on the part of the courts in defining an unlaw­
ful monopoly because so many "gaps" were left in the text.40 The 
broad interpretive approach taken by certain courts finds support in 
the remarks of Senator John Sherman of Ohio, the chief proponent 
of the Sherman Act. Senator Sherman explained to his colleagues 
32. See infra notes 12342 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text. 
34. See, e.g., infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
35. Originally, the Ninth Circuit had been partial to the doctrine as established in 
Berkey Photo. See, e.g., M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 691 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982); cf 
Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating, however, 
that the court was unsure because it reserved judgment on the issue of leveraging). 
36. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). 
37. The Third Circuit has recently followed the Ninth Circuit in rejecting Berkey 
Photo's monopoly leveraging. See Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 
171,206 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993). The court stated that "[i]n 
concert with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, we hold that in order to prevail 
upon a theory of monopoly leveraging, a plaintiff must prove threatened or actual mo­
nopoly in the leveraged market." [d. 
38. See infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text. 
39. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra notes 4142 and accompanying text. 
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as follows: "[I]t is difficult to define in legal language the precise 
line between lawful and unlawful combinations. This must be left 
for the courts to determine in each particular case."41 He contin­
ued, stating "[a]ll that we, as lawmakers can do is to declare general 
principles."42 This was certainly a broad delegation of power to the 
courts. 
Debate surrounding the original bill reinforced the notion that 
the Act would cover unilateral conduct. Senator George Gray of 
Delaware proposed amending the bill so that it would have con­
demned only concerted conduct while exempting unilateral con­
duct. Had his proposed amendment passed, pure monopoly and 
attempts to monopolize would not have been violations.43 Senator 
Gray was concerned that the courts would have too much difficulty 
in defining monopoly on a case by case basis.44 The Gray amend­
ment was quickly defeated, however, thereby fortifying the Judici­
ary's power to interpret and shape violations under the Sherman 
Act.45 The Supreme Court has reinforced this legislative decision, 
and in fact has established section 2 as the sole basis for evaluating 
unilateral conduct.46 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act address distinctly differ­
ent types of conduct. Under section 1, there must be concerted ac­
tion evidenced by a "contract" or "combination."47 When such a 
combination is found, a mere "restraint of trade" will constitute a 
violation.48 On the other hand, a single actor must possess a mo­
nopoly or have a dangerous probability of possessing a monopoly to 
violate section 2.49 This constitutes the primary difference between 
section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
41. 21 CONGo REC. 2460 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 122. 
42. Id. 
43. 21 CONGo REC. 3152 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 292-93. 
44. Id., reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 293. 
45. Id., reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 294. 
46. See infra notes 111-14 for a discussion of the proposition in Copperweld 
Corp. v Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
47. 15 U.S.c. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See supra note 3 for the relevant text 
of the statute. 
48. Id. 
49. 15 U.S.c. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See supra note 4 for the relevant text 
of the statute. The Supreme Court recently stated that "[m]onopoly power under § 2 
requires, of course, something greater than market power under § 1." Eastman Kodak, 
CO. V. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 (1992). Under § 1, because the 
combining of firms almost certainly evidences anti-competitive behavior, less disruption 
of the market is required by the courts to constitute a violation. Id. The courts conse­
quently demand a greater showing of market impact when a firm acts alone. Id. ("Re­
spondents' evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts market and 80% to 
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The Senate debate also indicated that Congress desired to re­
move "efficient" monopolies from the scope of the Sherman Act.50 
These monopolies are marked by the "acquisition of monopoly 
power through success in fair competition."51 The United States 
Supreme Court agreed with Congress that monopoly gained 
through fair competition is an entirely permissible activity.52 Natu­
ral monopoly receives similar permissive treatment. Natural mo­
nopoly occurs in "a market in which efficiencies of size are such 
that the entire output of the market can be most efficiently pro­
duced by a single firm."53 Establishing the fine line between lawful 
and unlawful monopolies is most difficult in the area of efficient 
monopolies. 
B. Pre-Berkey Photo Supreme Court Cases 
United States v. Griffith54 could be considered the first monop­
oly leveraging case.55 The defendant theater owners possessed sin­
gle theater monopolies in some towns and allegedly used this power 
to eliminate competition in towns in which other theaters competed 
with the defendants'.56 In Griffith, the Supreme Court held, "the 
use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose 
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a com­
petitor, is unlawful."57 In an even more sweeping statement, the 
95% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes, is, however, sufficient 
to survive summary judgment under the more stringent monopoly standard of § 2."). 
50. 21 CONGo REC. 3151-52 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 292. 
51. II EARL KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 12.14, at 376 (1980). 
52. See, e.g., United States V. E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 390 
n.15 (1956). 
53. KINTNER, supra note 51, § 12.14, at 374. Another antitrust treatise states: 
In the economic sense, natural monopoly is monopoly resulting from econo­
mies of scale, a relationship between the size of the market and the size of the 
most efficient firm such that one firm of efficient size can produce all or more 
than the market can take at a remunerative price, and can continually expand 
its capacity at less cost than that of a new firm entering the business. In this 
situation, competition may exist for a time but only until bankruptcy or 
merger leaves the field to one firm; in a meaningful sense, competition here is 
self-destructive. 
CARL KAYSEN & DAVID F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 191 (1959). 
54. 334 U.S. 100 (1948). 
55. See supra note 13 and accompanying text for a definition of leveraging. 
56. The complaint alleged that the defendant theater companies had agreements 
with the film distributors which prevented "their competitors from obtaining enough 
first- or second-run films from the distributors to operate successfully." Griffith, 334 
U.S. at 103 (footnote omitted). 
57. Id. at 107. 
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Court proclaimed "monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlaw­
fully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned 
under [section] 2 [of the Sherman Act]."58 Although the Court's 
language is broad, later decisions appear to restrict it to a point 
where some type of intent is necessary to find a violation.59 
Eighteen years later, the Supreme Court, in United States v. 
Grinnell Corp. ,60 defined the elements of a section 2 offense more 
specifically as "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the rele­
vant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse­
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci­
dent."61 Although this language has generated significant debate 
over the meaning of "willful," the Grinnell elements have become 
the standard by which courts judge monopoly power under section 
2.62 
The exclusion of "growth or development" from the reach of 
the Sherman Act was examined more fully in United States v. E.1. 
du Pont de Nemours & CO.63 While discussing monopoly power in 
Dupont the Supreme Court explained that an efficient monopoly, 
one marked by "extraordinary commercial success,"64 was excluded 
from the violative scope of the Sherman Act.65 The Court further 
held "control of price or competition establishes the existence of 
monopoly power under [section] 2."66 In Dupont, E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. ("Dupont") possessed seventy-five percent of the 
market share for cellophane.67 However, Dupont did not violate 
section 2 because it did not have the power to control competi­
tion.68 By requiring willful conduct and exempting natural monop­
58. Id. 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
60. 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
61. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added). 
62. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 
2090 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
63. 351 U.S. 377 (1956). The exclusion of growth or development was also ex­
amined in the legislative history section of this Note. See supra notes 50-52 and accom­
panying text. 
64. Id. at 390. 
65. Id. at 390-91 n.15. The Supreme Court quoted the Congressional Record 
where Senator Hoar explained to his colleagues that "a man who merely by superior 
skill and intelligence, ... got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as 
he could was not a monopolist." Id. at 391 n.15 (quoting 21 CONGo REc. 3151 (1890». 
66. Id. at 393. 
67. Id. at 379. 
68. Id. at 392. 
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oly, these later cases limited the applicability of the facially broad 
rule originally announced in Griffith. 
C. United States v. Aluminum Company of America69 
Judge Learned Hand wrote perhaps the most important and 
widely cited United States Court of Appeals decision regarding the 
question of monopoly power in United States v. Aluminum Com­
pany ofAmerica ("Alcoa").70 Praised and criticized by commenta­
tors71 and relied upon by the Berkey Photo Court, it provides some 
interesting insights for evaluating monopoly power. In what ap­
pears to be a pronouncement about legislative intent, the court 
stated, "[i]t is possible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, 
to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his suc­
cess upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great 
mass of those engaged must accept the direction of a few."72 Such 
an interpretation advocates a much harsher approach toward po­
tential monopolists. 
Judge Hand also discussed the definition of "intent" for the 
purposes of section 2. With regard to a monopolization claim, 
Judge Hand described the demand for specific intent as "non­
sense"73 and stated "no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of 
what he is doing."74 However, specific intent is still widely recog­
nized as a requirement for an attempt claim75 because there is no 
established monopoly upon which to focus. With the necessity for 
specific intent eliminated, it becomes easier to find violations of the 
Sherman Act because courts can merely focus upon the market in­
69. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). When the Alcoa litigation was appealed to the 
Supreme Court, four justices disqualified themselves and a quorum was not met. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court certified the case and allowed it to be heard by the 
three most senior circuit judges. The opinion is therefore similar to a Supreme Court 
opinion, in terms of its precedential value. PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 154 
(3d ed. 1981). 
70. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
71. See 2 MILTON HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN TRANsmoN 828-31 (1991). Milton 
Handler has suggested that many of the principles were sound but that the language 
went too far. Although the decision stood for over 30 years, it was not applied and 
clarified until the Berkey Photo decision. [d. In Berkey Photo, Judge Kaufman soft­
ened some of the language suggesting that it must be read in context. 
72. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427. 
73. [d. at 432. 
74. [d. Although Professor Robert Bork disagreed with much of Judge Hand's 
analysis, he did agree that there is no need for specific intent. ROBERT BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 160 (1978). 
75. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
602 (1985). 
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fluence. The preceding decisions became the building blocks for 
the monopoly leveraging doctrine as articulated in Berkey Photo. 
II. THE BERKEY PHOTO DECISION - FACTS AND ANALYSIS 
Due to its size and innovation, Eastman Kodak has sometimes 
been targeted for antitrust activities under the Sherman Act.76 
Many of the charges in Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 
can be traced back to the introduction, in 1972, of the 110 "Pocket 
Instamatic" camera, now a trademark of Kodak's manufacturing.77 
Kodak had the power to manufacture the only film that would work 
with this particular variety of camera and this power lasted for 
many months before any other companies could even compete.78 
To fully understand the case, one must first recognize the rele­
vant markets as follows: cameras, conventional film, photofinishing 
equipment, photofinishing services, and color print paper.79 Kodak 
was involved in all these markets, although it did not possess mo­
nopoly power in all of them.80 Kodak controlled about sixty per­
cent of the camera market and over eighty percent of the film 
market evidencing its tremendous power in these areas.81 The 
plaintiff, Berkey Photo, competed with Kodak primarily in the 
photo finishing services market in which Kodak clearly did not pos­
sess a monopoly.82 Berkey also owned a camera company which it 
sold during the litigation.83 Berkey conceded that Kodak did not 
"attempt to monopolize" these markets in the traditional section 2 
sense.84 Instead, Berkey argued that Kodak utilized its power in 
the film, color paper and camera markets to gain an unfair advan­
tage in the photofinishing equipment and services markets.85 The 
primary issue was whether Kodak had violated section 2 of the 
Sherman Act by gaining a competitive advantage in the photofin­
76. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 
(1992); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
77. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 268. 
78. Id. at 269. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 269-71. 
81. Id. at 269-70. 
82. Id. at 271. Although Berkey brought numerous antitrust charges, for the pur­
pose of this Note only those charges relating to the photo finishing services and 
photofinishing equipment markets will be examined. 
83. Id. at 269-70. 
84. Id. at 270-71. 
85. Id. at 267-68. 
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ishing market (in which they admittedly did not possess a monop­
oly) through the use of their monopoly in the film market. 
While interpreting the background of the Sherman Act, the 
Second Circuit asserted that section 2 gave the courts "a new juris­
diction to apply a common law against monopolizing."86 The court 
further noted that it had the latitude to decide what constitutes a 
monopoly, although it recognized that "it has been difficult to syn­
thesize the parts [of the Sherman Act] into a coherent and consis­
tent whole."87 This difficulty in evaluating potential monopoly 
offenses would later be referred to as the "tension" that underlies 
the entire Sherman Act.88 Conscious of the need to protect the 
competitive spirit, the court proceeded carefully in specifying a new 
doctrine. 
With its role clarified, the court examined the previous judicial 
treatment of monopoly power in general. Taking the lead from 
Judge Learned Hand,89 Judge Kaufman, writing for the Second Cir­
cuit, stated that the "[c]onsiderations of political and social policy 
form a major part of our aversion to monopolies, for concentration 
of power in the hands of a few obstructs opportunities for the 
rest."90 The court added that "monopoly power is 'inherently 
evil' "91 primarily "because it tends to damage the very fabric of our 
economy and our society."92 
Before addressing the issue of monopoly power in the two 
market situation and the monopoly leveraging issue, the court de­
veloped a working definition of unlawful monopoly. To formulate 
86. [d. at 272 (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANrrrRUST 
LAW 40 (1978) (quotations omitted from original». 
87. Id. at 272. 
88. Id. at 273. Before arriving at the actual leveraging analysis, the Berkey Photo 
court addressed at length what was earlier referred to as the tension behind section 2 of 
the Sherman Act. Id. Although monopoly power is recognized as inherently evil, 
"courts have declined to take what would have appeared to be the next logical step­
declaring monopolies unlawful per se." [d. The court noted that this apparent contra­
diction indicates that the courts walk a fine discretionary line in handling monopolies. 
If preservation of competition underlies the Sherman Act, then courts must not push 
the scope of violations too far because eventually the lazy and weak competitor will use 
the laws as a shield against its more powerful and efficient competitors. Id. Judge 
Kaufman observed that at this point the antitrust laws become self-defeating and 
"would thus compel the very sloth they were intended to prevent." [d. The antitrust 
laws are designed to protect competition and not competitors. 
89. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
90. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 273. 
91. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 
295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954». 
92. Id. 
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this definition, Judge Kaufman combined the principles of Griffith93 
and Grinnell94 to state "that the mere existence of monopoly power 
'whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired' is in itself violative of 
[section] 2, 'provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to 
exercise that power."'95 This last phrase reinforces the point that 
all monopolies cannot be condemned "ipso facto"96 because the law 
does not want to punish the competitor who is merely more effi­
cient. However, the court emphasized that "[e]ven if that power 
has been legitimately acquired, the monopolist may not wield it to 
prevent or impede competition."97 
With a working definition of unlawful monopoly established, 
the court next framed the issue precisely as "whether a firm violates 
[section] 2 by using its monopoly power in one market to gain a 
competitive advantage in another, albeit without an attempt to mo­
nopolize the second market. "98 The court concluded that such con­
duct constituted a violation even if competition in the second, non­
monopoly market was "merely distorted" as opposed to being de­
stroyed.99 In support of its holding, the court analogized the case 
before it to tying arrangements, where a customer is forced to buy 
an additional product along with the original product, although the 
additional product is not desired.1°O Purchase of the two products is 
therefore tied together and the customer is economically coerced 
into buying an unwanted product, especially if the manufacturer has 
93. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); see supra notes 54-59 and ac­
companying text. 
94. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); see supra notes 60-62 
and accompanying text. 
95. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274 (quoting Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107). 
96. Id. at 275. 
97. Id. at 274. 
98. Id. at 275. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 275-76. The Supreme Court has condemned tying as a violation of § 1 
because it is "unreasonable" per se. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 
S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (1992); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 
609 (1953). Section 1 of the Sherman Act contains language that calls for the elimina­
tion of all unreasonable restraints of trade. See supra note 3 for the relevant text of the 
statute. 
For a criticism of holding tying unlawful per se, see Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying 
Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957) (suggesting that courts 
re-evaluate their view of tying because it is not always used for monopolistic exploita­
tion); Richard S. Markovits, Tie-Ins, Leverage, and the American Antitrust Laws (pt. 2), 
80 YALE L.J. 195, 205 (1970) (suggesting that the exclusive function of tie-ins is not to 
impede competition). But see, Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three 
Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422 (1965) (criticizing the singular 
focus of Bowman upon economic efficiency). 
1994] ANTITRUST LAW-BERKEY PHOTO AND ALASKA AIRLINES 123 
a monopoly in the original market.101 Thus, instead of focusing on 
section 2 precedent alone, the. opinion focused on the overall policy 
considerations of the Sherman Act. 
The court clarified that "a large firm does not violate [section] 
2 simply by reaping the competitive rewards attributable to its effi­
cient size. "102 The court stressed that the focus should be upon the 
use of monopoly power.103 By excluding large firms with more effi­
cient operations, the court made it difficult to determine what uses 
of monopoly power were ultimately prohibited. 
Upon completing an analysis of the law, the court proceeded to 
apply its interpretations of the case law to the facts before it. While 
the court noted that Kodak's treatment of independent photofin­
ishers was "shoddy,"l04 it determined that a new trial would be nec­
essary on these issues if the parties did not reach an agreement.105 
Because only Kodak produced the Kodacolor II film and 110 cam­
eras,. independent photofinishers could not process this film "until 
they bought new equipment and received instruction in and sup­
plies for ... processing."l06 In addition, Kodak failed to provide 
prior notice of the introduction of the 110 Instamatic to its competi­
tors.107 The court did not decide whether this competitive advan­
tage was merely a product of superior skill or a result of Kodak's 
monopoly power in other markets. lOS The court's application of the 
doctrine to the facts, therefore, was left somewhat ambiguous be­
101. Although this succeeds as a reinforcing argument it must be remembered 
that "tying" is a § 1 offense; as such, the argument in the text merely provides persua­
sive support in this particular instance. 
102. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276. 
103. [d. at 276. 
104. [d. at 291. 
105. [d. at 292. 
106. [d. at 290. 
107. [d. The court stated: 

Kodak refused to divulge the formulae for chemicals used in the C-41 process. 

Large photofinishers like Berkey preferred to buy these compounds from 

chemical suppliers in bulk, both to save money and to gain flexibility. But to 

be able to process Kodacolor II, they were forced to buy pre-mixed "kits" 

from Kodak at twice the price. 

[d. 
108. [d. at 292. The court stated in pertinent part: 
Kodak's ability to gain a rapidly diminishing competitive advantage with the 
introduction of the 110 system may have been attributable to its innovation of 
a new system of photography, and not to its monopoly power. On the other 
hand, we cannot dismiss the possibility that Kodak's monopoly power in other 
markets was at least a partial root of its ability to gain an advantage over its 
photofinishing competitors and to sell them overpriced equipment. 
[d. The court concluded by saying "[w]e cannot resolve this ambiguity." [d. 
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cause the court held that a new trial would be necessary to fully 
resolve the controversy. 
The court spent a great of deal of time articulating the policy 
arguments in favor of monopoly leveraging. What may drive the 
doctrine is an underlying belief that monopoly is "inherently 
evil."109 Although the court stated that large firms wielding power 
based on efficiency are acceptable, the court was also wary of large 
firms in certain situations. As evidence of this, the court stated that 
"many anticompetitive actions are possible or effective only if 
taken by a firm that dominates its smaller rivals. "110 The warning in 
this language regarding larger firms provided much of the founda­
tion for the monopoly leveraging doctrine. 
III. PosT-BERKEY PHOTO JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Post-Berkey Photo Supreme Court Cases 
Prior to examining the cases that deal directly with Berkey 
Photo, it is helpful to consider subsequent United States Supreme 
Court decisions. These cases do not specifically address the ques­
tion of leveraging but, instead, provide evidence of the Court's ap­
proach to section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
To resolve any doubt left open in Berkey Photo, the Supreme 
Court in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.1ll made it 
clear that unilateral conduct is to be analyzed under section 2 of the 
Sherman Act,112 The Supreme Court reasoned that "[s]ubjecting a 
single firm's every action to judicial scrutiny for reasonableness 
would threaten to discourage the competitive enthusiasm that the 
antitrust laws seek to promote,"113 and consequently "the [Sher­
man] Act's plain language leaves no doubt that Congress made a 
purposeful choice to accord different treatment to unilateral and 
concerted conduct."1l4 This relatively recent language by the 
Supreme Court suggests a certain amount of deference for those 
firms that act unilaterally. 
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,115 the 
Supreme Court discussed the necessity for "predatory" conduct to 
109. Id. at 273 (quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. 
Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954». 
110. Id. at 274-75. 
111. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). 
112. Id. at 767 n.13. 
113. Id. at 775. 
114. Id. 
115. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
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maintain a successful monopolization claim under section 2 of the 
Sherman ACt.116 The Court endorsed the necessity of "exclusion­
ary" or "anticompetitive" conduct.117 These requirements appear 
to be lacking in monopoly leveraging as articulated by the Second 
Circuit.llS More specifically, the Supreme Court had previously in­
dicated that courts should view the Sherman Act narrowly without 
overemphasizing the general purpose of the Act.1l9 
Most recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the principles of 
Grinnell and Aspen Skiing in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Techni­
cal Services, Inc. 120 In Image Technical Services, competitors had 
accused Kodak of using its monopoly in the parts market for its 
photocopiers to try to gain a monopoly in the service market.121 
The Court asserted that "[i]f Kodak adopted its parts and service 
policies as part of a scheme of willful acquisition or maintenance of 
monopoly power, it will have violated [section] 2."122 The Court 
found a determination of willful conduct necessary for a conviction 
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
B. Post-Berkey Photo Circuit and District Court Cases 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed Ber­
key Photo in subsequent cases123 and district courts within that cir­
116. Id. at 602. 
117. Id. 
118. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,275 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
119. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 776 (1984). 
120. 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090-91 (1992). 
121. Id. at 2091. 
122. Id. at 2090. The Court cited a string of cases to support this proposition 
including Grinnell, Aspen Skiing, and Aluminum Co. of Am. 
123. See Grand Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (stating the three elements of leveraging as follows: "monopoly power in one 
market," the Griffith requirement of foreclosing competition or gaining a competitive 
advantage, and "injury caused by the challenged conduct"). 
The court asserted that monopoly leveraging was now an embedded and estab­
lished legal doctrine. Consequently, for the purposes of this discussion, the Grand 
Light case provides little additional insight to that already propounded in Berkey. 
Photo. 
See also Twin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990). 
1\vin Labs was a growing producer in the nutritional supplement market competing 
with the giant, Weider Health & Fitness. Id. at 567. Weider Corporation also owned 
the two most popular magazines dealing with health and fitness. Id. 1\vin Labs placed 
the largest percentage of its advertisements in these magazines because they reached 
the widest group of interested parties. Id. When 1\vin Labs' market share began to 
increase, Weider denied them further advertising space in their magazines forcing them 
to rely upon less popular competing magazines. Id. 
1\vin Labs subsequently initiated a lawsuit and the complaint alleged in part mo­
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cuit have, of necessity, followed the ruleP4 
Following the Second Circuit's lead, the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit also adopted the monopoly leveraging doctrine. 
In 1983, the Sixth Circuit referred to the doctrine favorably, analo­
gizing it to tying.125 The court concluded that the only difference 
between tying and leveraging is that, with tying, the second item is 
forced upon the buyer, while with leveraging the non-monopoly 
market is merely distorted.126 Subsequent to this tangential discus­
sion of the leveraging doctrine, the same court openly endorsed 
monopoly leveraging in Kerasotes Michigan Theatres, Inc. v. Na­
tional Amusements, Inc. 127 Relying primarily on Berkey Photo and 
Griffith, the court held that a theater owner had a valid claim 
against a competing theater owner who attempted to use its monop­
oly in another geographical market to prevent competition in the 
shared market.128 The court first noted that the defendant pos­
sessed lawful monopoly power in an outside market.129 The ques­
tion before the court was whether the defendant theater owner had 
violated the Sherman Act despite the absence of monopoly power 
in the shared market. Although the defendant did not possess mo­
nopolization and attempted monopolization. The court mentioned Berkey Photo in an­
alyzing the attempted monopolization claim and mistakenly claimed that Berkey Photo 
involved a tying claim. Id. at 570-71. It is crucial to remember that tying is a § 1 offense 
focusing more on the nature of the defendant's conduct than on the market impact. See 
Anthony E. DiResta et aI., "Monopoly Leveraging": Irrelevant Dicta or a New Section 
2 Challenge For Integrated Firms, in 695 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, MONOPOLI­
ZATION AND TYING CASES IN THE 90's, 57, 71-72 (1991) (questioning the Twin Labs 
analysis saying: "It must be pointed out, however, that such analysis by the Second 
Circuit of Berkey is inaccurate. A claim of tying falls within Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act - with the focus of the inquiry on the defendant's conduct, not on the market 
impact."). Although this case reaffirms the Berkey Photo holding, it does so with some 
confusion. 
124. See, e.g., Viacom Int'! Inc. v. Time Inc., 785 F. Supp. 371, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992) (recognizing the Berkey Photo doctrine but not applying it because the facts did 
not warrant such action); Carleton v. Vermont Dairy Herd Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 
782 F. Supp. 926, 934 (D. Vt. 1991) (following the doctrine saying that "[t]he Second 
Circuit's seminal decision in Berkey Photo is instructive"). 
125. White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495, 506 (6th 
Cir. 1983). See supra note 100 and accompanying text for an explanation of tying. 
126. Id. 
127. 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom; G.K.C. Michigan Thea­
tres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 490 U.S. 1087 (1989). 
128. Id. at 136-37. National and Kerasotes competed vigorously in the Flint, 
Michigan area. Kerasotes attempted to avoid competition by splitting the first run mov­
ies with National. National claimed that when this attempt failed "Kerasotes began to 
use its monopoly position in other geographical markets to obtain films in the Flint 
market, films Kerasotes would not have otherwise been able to obtain." Id. at 136. 
129. Id. at 136-37. 
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nopoly power in the shared market, the court held that merely gain­
ing an advantage in this market allowed the plaintiff to maintain a 
c1aim.130 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reserved 
judgment on the issue of monopoly leveraging in Association for 
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. N. c.A.A. 131 For years, the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") was the gov­
erning body for men's collegiate sports and the Association for In­
tercollegiate Athletics for Women ("AIAW") was the governing 
body for women's collegiate sports. In 1981, the NCAA began 
sanctioning women's sports and, being the more· powerful organiza­
tion, drove AIAW into financial hardship.132 AIAW's complaint al­
leged that the NCAA had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act 
"by using its monopoly power in men's college sports to facilitate its 
entry into women's college sports and to force AIAW out of exist­
ence."133 The court, in language that appeared somewhat disap­
proving, said "[i]n light of the substantial academic criticism cast 
upon the leveraging concept, we reserve [judgment] for a case in 
which decision of the question is necessary."134 The court held that 
even if leveraging doctrine was applied, it could find no economic 
injury based upon a "use" in women's sports of the monopoly 
power held by the NCAA in men's sports.135 The Courts of Ap­
peals for the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have also withheld judg­
ment on the monopoly leveraging doctrine.136 
130. Id. at 137. The similarity in fact patterns to Griffith (competing theater own­
ers) may have led the court to this result, since it relied as much upon Griffith as 'Berkey 
Photo. 
131. 735 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
132. Id. at 580. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 586 n.14. 
135. Id. at 586-88. 
136. See, e.g., Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 
910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990). Advanced Health Care Services ("AHCS") was a com­
pany providing durable medical equipment ("DME") largely to discharged patients of 
Radford Community Hospital. Radford subsequently entered the DME market and 
AHCS sales dropped off sharply, because many discharged patients used Radford spon­
sored DME. AHCS alleged "discharge personnel unduly influenced patients to discon­
tinue relations with AHCS, [and] that they steered or referred patients to Southwest 
solely for the financial gain of Radford." Id. at 143. Applying leveraging analysis to the 
facts of the case the court held that the leveraging claim could withstand the motion to 
dismiss. Id. at 149-50. However, because the case was at an "undeveloped stage," with 
respect to monopoly leveraging as an offense, the court noted that "[w]e reserve defini­
tive resolution of that issue for a case in which the issue is squarely presented." Id. at 
149 n.17. 
See also Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), 
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Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struggled 
with the monopoly leveraging issue before deciding not to adopt 
the Berkey Photo holding. In M.A.P. Oil Co., Inc. v. Texaco Inc. ,137 
the court recited theories of monopoly under section 2 stating 
"[a]mong those forms is the theory that a firm violates [section] 2 
by using its monopoly power in one market to gain an unwarranted 
competitive advantage in another."138 Although this language is 
somewhat ambiguous, at least one district court read it as a clear 
endorsement of Berkey Photo explaining "[t]he Berkey Photo opin­
ion, by virtue of its adoption in Mapp [sic], seems to have settled 
the question in this circuit of whether a 'pure' monopoly leveraging 
theory exists. "139 Thus the district court recognized the viability of 
the monopoly leveraging doctrine within the Ninth Circuit. 
However, four years later in Catlin v. Washington Energy 
Co. ,140 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dispelled the no­
tion that M.A.P. Oil Co. was an endorsement of Berkey Photo. The 
Catlin court stated M.A.P. Oil still required an "unwarranted" com­
petitive advantage, thus distinguishing it from Berkey Photo,141 
which did not impose such a requirement. Furthermore, the court 
questioned whether Berkey Photo itself really intended to go as far 
as some people had suggested.142 The real difficulty comes in deter­
mining when the "use" crosses the line between mere efficiency and 
unfair competitive advantage. The Ninth Circuit obviously strug­
gled with that fundamental issue and the reservation in Catlin set 
vacated, 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992). The plaintiff in this case was a supplier of dura­
ble medical equipment ("DME") whose business dropped off significantly when the 
Venice Hospital entered the DME market. The hospital had a special patient equip­
ment coordinator who had no training in follow-up health. care. [d. at 1554. The bot­
tom line was that 85% of Venice Hospital patients needing DME obtained it from the 
hospital's own company. [d. at 1555. After addressing traditional attempt and conspir­
acy claims, the court moved on to the leveraging claims saying "[w]hile we harbour 
some reservation about the Second Circuit's conclusion that no attempt to monopolize 
the leveraged market need be proved, that aspect of the monopoly leveraging theory is 
not problematic in this case." [d. at 1567. At trial, the judge had actually charged the 
jury upon attempted monopolization using words such as "willfully" and "conscious 
objective." [d. Although the court appeared to endorse the leveraging doctrine, it was 
merely dicta because it held that "[a]ll the other elements of an attempt to monopolize 
under Section 2 are present in this case." [d. 
137. 691 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982). 
138. [d. (emphasis added). 
139. Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1516 
(E.D. Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986). 
140. 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986). 
141. [d. at 1346. 
142. [d. 
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the stage for the decision in Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, 
Inc. 
IV. THE ALASKA AIRLINES DECISON - FACTS AND ANALYSIS143 
In 1974, American Airlines attempted to gather support among 
the major airlines to form a jointly owned computer reservation ser­
vice ("CRS").l44 This plan failed, however, and United Airlines 
and American Airlines each formed their own CRS.145 Smaller air­
lines would then join these services at a per booking rate.146 Be­
cause American Airlines and United Airlines were the two largest 
143. 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991). cert. denied. 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). The district 
court that heard Alaska Airlines issued an opinion based on Ninth Circuit precedent. 
Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re Air Passenger Computer 
Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig.), 694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Cal. 1988). The district court 
began by establishing that the Ninth Circuit had rejected a pure monopoly leveraging 
doctrine where any competitive advantage gained in the second market would be 
actionable. [d. at 1472. The court also cited Ninth Circuit precedent that clearly 
delineated between "aggressive competition on the merits" and "anticompetitive 
abuse" of monopoly power. Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 
534, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1983). This crucial distinction became the fulcrum upon which the 
case turns and where the district court apparently disagreed with Berkey Photo. 
In contrast to the Second Circuit's leveraging doctrine, the district court offered 
different elements for a successful leveraging claim. First, "the activity complained of 
must entail an abuse of monopoly power itself, as opposed to the mere use of 
competitive advantages ...." Air Passenger, 694 F. Supp. at 1473 (quoting Grason 
E1ec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504,1517 (E.D. Cal. 1983), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986).). Second, the advantage must be "unwarranted," a term 
that generated significant analysis later in the opinion. [d. Finally, the plaintiff must 
define both the original monopoly market and the market in which the defendant is 
allegedly intruding. [d. The strict requirements for abuse of monopoly power and 
"unwarranted advantage" distinguish this from the Second Circuit's analysis. 
"Unwarranted advantage" may parallel the Second Circuit requirement of a 
competitive advantage, but it could also be seen as requiring a stronger showing. 
In struggling with definitions, the district court explained that "unwarranted should 
be interpreted in light of existing antitrust learning pertaining to 'willful acquisition or 
maintenance.'" [d. (quoting Grason, 571 F. Supp. at 1518). The court further defined 
"willful acquisition or maintenance" based upon a test of unreasonableness. [d. at 1473. 
If an actor's conduct involves an unreasonable restraint of trade, it constitutes willful 
acquisition or maintenance and is therefore a violation, provided the other .elements are 
satisfied. Armed with this ~efinition, the district court held that display biasing (the 
primary monopoly leveraging complaint in this case) could be construed as 
unreasonable. [d. at 1474. It unreasonably injured consumers by harnessing them with 
more expensive flights because the reservation attendant did not realize that other less 
expensive flights were available. [d. 
144. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). A CRS is a group of on-line terminals con­
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services (by having the most travel agent subscribers), they were 
also the most desirable.147 Initially, the services charged extremely 
high rates, but they subsequently became subject to government 
regulation, leading to much more reasonable and uniform rates.148 
As a rule, smaller airlines would subscribe to every CRS in order to 
receive maximum exposure.149 Because the services charged a per 
booking rate, as opposed to a flat rate, it was not financially bur­
densome for airlines to subscribe to multiple services.15o Although 
the per booking charges were minimal, the smaller airlines were 
unhappy that the larger airlines could demand any fee. Conse­
quently, they brought an antitrust action claiming that the larger 
airlines were "leveraging" their dominance in the CRS market in 
order to gain an advantage in the air travel market.151 The plaintiff 
small airlines argued that by having control over the smaller air­
lines' information in the CRS market, the larger airlines could mold 
and control the plaintiffs' place in the air travel market.152 The 
smaller airlines charged that the larger airlines engaged in display 
biasing. Display biasing involved giving the defendant's own flights 
more desirable positions on the terminal screens, thereby cheating 
customers out of potentially less expensive flights.153 The plaintiffs 
also charged that the defendants were denying them access to an 
"essential facility,"154 another antitrust claim which the court dis­





150. Id. at 539. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. See Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re Air Passenger 
Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig.), 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1474 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
For a detailed discussion of CRS problems, see Larry Locke, Flying the Unfriendly 
Skies: The Legal Fallout Over the Use of Computer Reservation Systems as a Competi­
tive Weapon in the Airline Industry, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 219 (1989). 
154. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 539. 
155. For an example of a classic essential facilities case, see Otter Tail Power Co. 
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). In that case, Otter Tail Power Company provided 
"retail" electrical services to towns. Some towns requested that they receive "whole­
sale" services and provide the retail aspect themselves. Otter Tail denied such requests 
and the Supreme Court held that this was a denial of essential facilities because Otter 
Tail's services could not be duplicated. With respect to Otter Tail's denial of wholesale 
services, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he record makes abundantly clear that Otter 
Tail used its monopoly power in the towns in its service area to foreclose competition or 
gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, all in violation of the antitrust 
laws." Id. at 377. The Alaska Airlines court dismissed the applicability of Otter Tail to 
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Catlin, had al­
ready reserved judgment on the question of monopoly leverag­
ing.156 In Alaska Airlines, the court moved one step further and 
refuted the Berkey Photo decision, declaring it irreconcilable with 
the expressly stated section 2 offenses.157 Although Griffith pro­
vided major support for the reasoning in Berkey Photo, the Alaska 
Airlines court began by dismissing it in a footnote.15s The court 
noted that because Griffith concerned a section 1 offense, it con­
tained broad language which was not controlling.159 The court then 
cited to Copperweld v. Independence Tube Corp., 160 decided after 
Berkey, to reinforce the distinction between section 1 and section 2 
offenses.161 In the same footnote, the court also dismissed the Sixth 
Circuit's opinion in Kerasotes 162 "for the same reasons"163 it re­
jected Berkey Photo.t64 
the case at hand. The court stated "[a]s the Supreme Court indicated, Otter Tail Power 
had both attempted to monopolize and had succeeded in monopolizing the downstream 
market for 'retail' electric services." Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 543 (citing Otter Tail 
Power Co., 410 U.S. at 377-79). 
Prior to examining the leveraging claims the court addressed the essential facilities 
claims. This part of the court's discussion merits attention in order to demonstrate the 
link between "essential facilities" and the "monopoly leveraging" doctrines. The court 
stated that "the essential facilities doctrine imposes liability when one firm, which con­
trols an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or service 
that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first." [d. at 542. Like 
monopoly leveraging, this represents a § 2 offense because it applies to the unilateral 
conduct of an actor and it involves two distinct markets. 
Primarily because the defendants did not possess the requisite power to eliminate 
downstream competition (in the court's estimation), the court dismissed this initial 
claim. [d. at 546. In this case, airline flights were the downstream market because they 
flowed from or were downstream from the CRS market. Because the smaller airlines 
could have withdrawn from the questionable CRS networks and still have survived, the 
larger airlines were therefore not in control of the air travel market. Such a condition 
precludes an essential facilities claim. The court noted that the ability of the smaller 
airlines to pull out of the given CRS "severely limited" United or American in their 
ability to abuse the downstream market. [d. at 545. 
Furthermore, the court asserted that without the power to eliminate competition 
the plaintiff must show either monopoly or attempted monopoly, a theme which carries 
over into the court's analysis of monopoly leveraging. Id. at 546. 
156. Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1986). 
157. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549. 
158. [d. at 547 n.16. 
159. [d. 
160. 467 U.S. 752 (1984); see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
161. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16. 
162. Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 135 
(6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom., G.K.C. Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National 
Amusements, Inc., 490 U.S. 1087 (1989); see supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. 
163. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16. 
164. Although this appears to be relatively terse treatment for such important 
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied quite heavily 
upon Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. ,165 which 
was also decided after Berkey Photo. Most importantly, Aspen Ski­
ing reinforced the notion that the presence of "predatory" conduct 
was necessary for a violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act.l66 
The court used Aspen Skiing to strengthen the proposition that 
"the Sherman Act does not attack every monopoly."167 The Alaska 
Airlines court emphasized the conduct which survives scrutiny 
under the Sherman Act.168 Conversely, the Berkey Photo court 
merely stated that some monopolies are tolerated, but not 
cherished.169 
While Berkey Photo began with the proposition that monopoly 
power is "'inherently evil,' "170 no such language exists in the 
Alaska Airlines opinion. The court actually praised the efficient 
monopoly, downplaying its danger by explaining it "will continue 
only so long as the monopolist sustains a level of efficiency or inno­
vation such that its rivals cannot effectively compete."171 The court 
explained that efficient monopolies would police themselves and 
that they were beyond the reach of the Sherman Act due to their 
economic efficiency.l72 The Alaska Airlines court stressed that 
these "efficient monopolies" exist absent the predatory practices 
described in Aspen SkiingP3 
The Ninth Circuit strengthened this discussion of acceptable 
monopolies by pointing to "natural monopolies."174 The court sug­
gested that governmental regulation, as opposed to judicial inter­
vention, is the best way to deal with natural monopolies because the 
legislature is better suited to making decisions regarding price con-
precedent, the case did not add much to the reasoning already propounded in Berkey 
Photo. The Sixth Circuit merely accepted the doctrine with little analysis. Also, Sixth 
Circuit precedent is not binding on the Ninth Circuit. 
165. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
166. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985)). 
167. Id. The court also used another case from the Ninth Circuit, United States v. 
Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990), to fortify its position. 
168. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547. 
169. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
170. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 
295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)); see supra notes 91-92 
and accompanying text. 
171. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547. 
172. Id. at 549. 
173. Id. at 547. 
174. Id. at 548. 
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trols.115 Throughout this discussion, the court made no reference to 
the "evils" of monopoly. In fact, the court's statement that "[t]he 
antitrust laws tolerate both efficient monopolies and natural mo­
nopolies,"176 is the harshest anti-monopoly tone in the entire 
Alaska Airlines opinion. Instead of dwelling, on the negative as­
pects of monopolies, the Alaska Airlines court emphasized permis­
sible monopolies and their positive aspects. 
The court further explained that the elements of "attempted 
monopolization" and "monopolization" were developed specifically 
to differentiate between lawful and unlawful monopoly.177 The 
court noted that any attempt to circumvent these requirements cer­
tainly misinterprets the spirit of the law and wrongfully punishes 
those who are undeserving of punishment. By concluding monop­
oly leveraging is not anti-competitive conduct, but merely a benefit 
of possessing an efficient monopoly, the Alaska Airlines court dis­
agreed fundamentally with the Berkey Photo court.178 According 
to the Alaska Airlines court, when natural and efficient monopolies 
are permitted to continue, which is the effect of the Sherman Act 
scheme, society must deal with any unpleasant side effects without 
banning them outright.179 The court attempted to equate monopoly 
leveraging with the other monopoly consequences which are per­
mitted, such as setting a high price, which is not anti-competitive in 
and of itself.180 The court also appeared reluctant to stray from set­
tled Ninth Circuit precedent and the Supreme Court cases decided 
after Berkey Photo.181 
175. [d. The Ninth Circuit cited Berkey Photo's own language regarding pricing 
to arrive at this conclusion. "[J]udicial oversight of pricing policies would place the 
courts in a role akin to that of a public regulatory commission. We would be wise to 
decline that function unless Congress clearly bestows it upon us." Berkey Photo, Inc. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
176. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 548. 
177. [d. The court had relied upon this same basic argument in its discussion of 
essential facilities. [d. at 546. It is apparent that the court was satisfied with the reach 
of the traditionally established offenses. 
178. [d. 
179. [d. at 549. The Alaska Airlines court asserted that concerns for efficiency 
outweighed any possible harm in this particular case. Another case where a regulated 
monopolist "seeks to evade regulations which limit profits in the monopoly market by 
creeping into adjacent, unregulated markets" would provide a wholly different scenario. 
[d. at 549 n.17. 
180. [d. at 548-49. 
181. The court used Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752 
(1984), to refute United States v. Griffith, although Griffith was fundamental to Berkey 
Photo. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16. The court also used Aspen Skiing to 
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Finally, the court declared that monopoly leveraging has the 
inherent potential to backfire on the supposed monopolist.1s2 By 
pushing customers in the leveraged market too hard with these 
techniques, the monopolist will only force the customer to look 
elsewhere, thereby providing encouragement to competing firms.1s3 
In the wake of this dissatisfaction, competing firms will be rejuve­
nated with the belief that they can successfully challenge the holder 
of monopoly power.184 
Other courts have approached the validity of monopoly lever­
aging somewhat differently. The majority of courts, however, have 
recognized that leveraging marks a departure from the expressly 
stated offenses outlined in the Sherman Act.18S The Berkey Photo 
court and its progeny opined that certain forms of unilateral con­
duct deserved greater scrutiny. Conversely, the Alaska Airlines 
court sought to provide certain protections for large corporations 
acting unilaterally. 
V. ANALYSIS 
The challenge in reconciling Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines 
lies in the lack of definitive precedent from the Supreme Court. 
Citing a gap of twenty years between Grinnell and Aspen Skiing, 
one commentator has remarked upon the shortage of section 2 de­
cisions by the high court.186 Whatever the reasons for this lack of 
precedent, legal practitioners are left with little guidance in evaluat­
ing the status of possible section 2 offenses.ls7 
Deference should be given to those firms acting unilaterally. 
Furthermore, monopoly leveraging cannot possibly be a species of 
an attempt to monopolize claim due to its failure to meet the strict 
reinforce the need for predatory conduct which it noted was lacking in the case before 
it. [d. at 547. 
182. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549. 
183. [d. 
184. [d. 
185. Most recently, the Third Circuit, in Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 
Inc., 980 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993) followed the Alaska 
Airlines holding. The Third Circuit relied most heavily upon the differences between 
§§ 1 and 2 outlined in the Supreme Court's Copperweld opinion to support its holding. 
[d. at 206. 
186. 3 Michael Malina, Supreme Court Update-1985, in ANTITRUST IN TRANSI. 
TION 1073, 1074 (Milton Handler ed. 1991). 
187. [d.; see also Lawrence A. Sullivan, Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Vertical 
Strategies by Dominant Firms, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1230 (1992) (noting the difficulty 
in formulating antitrust policy). 
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attempt requirements.188 Finally, leveraging not only fails to meet 
the market power requirements for a monopoly claim, but it also 
espouses a "use" element which is too strict for the vertically inte­
grated competitor. 
A. Unilateral vs. Concerted Conduct 
Unilateral conduct involves the conduct of a single firm 
whereas concerted conduct involves multiple firms. The plain lan­
guage of the Sherman Act indicates that concerted action receives 
greater scrutiny because any "contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise"189 which results in a "restraint of trade"190 con­
stitutes a violation under section 1. Even without a finding of ac­
tual monopoly or intent to monopolize, concerted action which 
merely restrains trade violates section 1. Under the section 2 for­
mulation, however, unilateral activity may constitute a violation, 
but only if the actor actually monopolizes or attempts to monopo­
lize a market.191 
The Supreme Court has addressed the different treatment of 
unilateral and concerted conduct under the Sherman Act. Analyz­
ing the language of the statute, the Court stated the Sherman Act 
"leaves untouched a single firm's anticompetitive conduct ... [even 
though that conduct] may be indistinguishable in economic effect 
from the conduct of two firms subject to [section] 1 liability."l92 
The Court further stated "that Congress left this 'gap' [between sec­
tions 1 and 2] for eminently sound reasons."193 The Supreme Court 
noted that Congress made a "purposeful choice" to treat unilateral 
and concerted conduct differently.194 The clear distinction between 
188. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
189. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the relevant text of this statute, 
see supra note 3. 
190. [d. 
191. Section 2 reads "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monop­
olize ... shall be deemed guilty." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The attempt 
to monopolize requires a specific intent coupled with a "dangerous probability" of suc­
cess making it a far more difficult standard to meet than the § 1 "restraint of trade" 
formulation. Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See supra note 
12 and accompanying text. The plaintiff in a § 2 case must present stronger evidence of 
market power. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2090 
(1992). Congress apparently displayed deference toward unilateral conduct by requir­
ing this more difficult showing. 
192. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984). 
193. [d. 
194. [d.; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 
(1984) (stating "there is the basic distinction between concerted and independent ac­
tion-a distinction not always clearly drawn by parties and courts"). 
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unilateral and concerted action raises concerns about analogizing 
between multiple and single firm conduct. The Supreme Court 
clearly expressed a desire to show deference to single firm conduct 
but has accorded no such deference to concerted conduct.195 
Despite the differences in treatment between unilateral and 
concerted conduct articulated by the Supreme Court, for purposes 
of a monopoly leveraging violation under the Sherman Act, it ap­
pears that unilateral conduct and concerted conduct need to be 
treated in the same manner. At least one commentator has sug­
gested the soundness of such an approach.196 This theory asserts 
that the "gap" between sections 1 and 2 needs bridging. When a 
monopolist possesses monopoly power in one market and is in­
volved in other markets, the monopoly leveraging approach as­
sumes that the monopolist should be held to a standard similar to 
the "restraint of trade" in section 1. This methodology, however, 
contradicts Supreme Court precedent and uses the logic that if not 
for the differences in sections 1 and 2 these situations would cer­
tainly constitute offenses. The Supreme Court in Copperweld Corp. 
v. Independence Tube Corp. refuted that logic by recognizing the 
validity and necessity of the gap.197 The language of the Sherman 
Act198 and recent Supreme Court pronouncements199 indicate that 
courts should proceed cautiously and not attempt to eliminate the 
deferential treatment of single firms in contravention of the statute. 
Any attempt at bridging the "gap" contravenes the Sherman Act as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
Both the Berkey Photo and the Alaska Airlines courts appear 
195. Copperweld, 467 u.s. at 775. 
196. See Hawk, supra note 13, at 1156-59. Professor Hawk distinguishes carefully 
between what he calls "Griffith" situations and "non-Griffith" situations. A Griffith 
situation involves an entity which has monopoly power in one market and misuses that 
power in a second market (basically the same situation as Berkey Photo). He contends 
that the Griffith operator should be held to a higher standard than a two market com­
petitor that does not have a monopoly in either market. In his view, courts had already 
been eager to attack such situations and establishing this new "Griffith" standard would 
eliminate haggling over traditional "attempt" terms such as "specific intent" and "dan­
gerous probability." Id. at 1158. He finally rationalizes this position by explaining that 
"if not" for the differences in §§ 1 and 2, this would certainly be a violation of the 
Sherman Act. Id. at 1159; see also 2 Michael Malina, The Antitrust Jurisprudence of the 
Second Circuit, in ANTITRUST IN TRANSITION, supra note 186 at 817, 831 (praising the 
soundness of Judge Kaufman's opinion). 
197. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984). 
198. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1-2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the relevant text of these 
sections, see supra notes 3-4. 
199. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769; Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 
U.S. 752, 761 (1984). 
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to agree that if the conduct in question were performed by multiple 
entities, it would clearly violate the Sherman Act.2OO However, 
courts and commentators have noted that Congress consciously 
placed a gap between monopoly power based on concerted conduct 
and monopoly power based on unilateral conduct. 201 The court in 
Alaska Airlines proceeded on the premise that the gap between sec­
tions 1 and 2 requires preserving, as evidenced by its reliance on the 
expressly stated section 2 offenses.202 Judge Kaufman in Berkey 
Photo, on the other hand, suggested that the gap may need bridging 
to fulfill the overall intent of eliminating anti-competitive 
monopoly.203 
From the Alaska Airlines opinion, it appears that the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied heavily upon the differences 
between the treatment of unilateral and concerted conduct sug­
gested by Copperweld to reach the conclusion that monopoly lever­
aging is not an offense under section 2 of the Sherman Act. One 
commentator has suggested that the Ninth Circuit's reliance on 
Copperweld was misplaced because that case dealt with a section 1 
violation.204 Regardless of whether this is true, the Alaska Airlines 
court used the recently expressed differences between sections 1 
and 2 to quickly dismiss Griffith.205 Because Copperweld was 
200. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991), 
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 
263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
201. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 
(1984) (explaining that the gap between §§ 1 and 2 should be allowed to continue); 
Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1513 (1983), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986) (recognizing the theoretical gap in the Sherman Act). But 
see, Hawk, supra note 13, at 1156-59 (asserting that the gap should be closed in certain 
situations). 
202. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549. In rejecting the Berkey Photo leveraging 
doctrine the Third Circuit relied heavily upon Copperweld saying "we have the benefit 
of Copperweld's [sic] explication of the Sherman Act's purposeful 'gap' in liability." 
Fmeman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 206 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
113 S. Ct. 1285 (1993). 
203. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 272, 274. 
204. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1255. Professor Sullivan stated: 
nothing in the [Copperweld] opinion implies that a blatant, anticompetitive 
attack by a monopolist on a related market passes scrutiny unless it creates a 
new monopoly. Indeed, the Court in Copperweld did not evaluate the chal­
lenged conduct to decide whether it would have been bad enough to run afoul 
of section 2. The whole point of Copperweld was that defendant's conduct, 
however bad, was not subject to antitrust evaluation; section 1 did not apply 
because it was single firm conduct, and section 2 did not apply because there 
was no showing of power. 
[d. 
205. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 774-77). 
138 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:111 
clearly a section 1 case, its use by the Ninth Circuit to dismiss Grif­
fith appears logically inconsistent. The court had dismissed Griffith 
because it was a section 1 case, but it used Copperweld, also a sec­
tion 1 case, to accomplish this end.206 Although this complete dis­
missal of Griffith seems potentially overbroad, the Alaska Airlines 
court was following sound logic in recognizing the differences be­
tween sections 1 and 2. By interweaving section 1 's focus on the 
actor's conduct (as opposed to market effect) into a section 2 of­
fense, leveraging, as propounded in Berkey Photo, oversteps the 
bounds established in Copperweld. Consequently, the Court of Ap­
peals for the Ninth Circuit correctly realized that leveraging fails to 
consider adequately the question of market power in the relevant 
market.207 
B. New Section 2 Offense? 
A critical question exists as to whether Berkey Photo's monop­
oly leveraging was meant to be a completely new offense or just a 
species of an "attempt" claim.208 Arguments on both sides revert 
back to the discussion on legislative intent concerning the role of 
the courts in shaping new doctrine.209 If Congress merely intended 
for the courts to define the elements for each of the three enumer­
ated offenses of section 2, the. appropriateness of the Berkey Photo 
doctrine should be challenged because leveraging exceeds the spe­
cific requirements for any of the enumerated offenses.210 
In Senate debate, Senator Sherman asserted that deciding be­
tween lawful and unlawful combinations "must be left for the courts 
to determine in each particular case."211 This language bestows lib­
erallinedrawing power upon the courts, but it addresses combina-
Griffith contained some very broad language with regard to the use of monopoly 
power. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). The Griffith Court stated 
"monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil 
and stand condemned under § 2 [of the Sherman Act]." Id. 
206. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 547 n.16 (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 774-77). 
207. Id. at 548. 
208. One case suggested the importance of this question by stating, "[i]t is in this 
light [the type of offense being created] that the question of whether 'monopoly lever­
aging' is a 'new' [s]ection 2 offense - as opposed to being some variant on one of the 
original three offenses - may be of greatest significance." Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacra­
mento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1515 n.14 (E.D. Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 1103 (1986). 
209. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
210. See Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments-1979, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 9 n.61 (1981). 
211. 21 CONGo REC. 2455 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 122. 
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tions and not single firm conduct. In light of the recognized 
differences between unilateral and concerted conduct,212 this lan­
guage loses some of its persuasiveness as a grant of discretion to the 
courts. In section 2, Congress enumerated three specific offenses213 
and the courts should not circumvent this formulation.214 It is one 
thing to interpret what fits within a certain category, but it is quite 
another to create an entirely new category of offense. 
Generally, the United States Supreme Court adheres strictly to 
the three offense format explicitly outlined in the Sherman Act and 
has refrained from discussing specific doctrines such as monopoly 
leveraging.215 Therefore, it is helpful to examine monopoly lever­
aging in terms of the expressly stated offenses. The offense of mo­
nopoly under section 2 contains the requirements of possession of 
monopoly power in the relevant market and "the willful acquisition 
or maintenance of that power."216 The monopoly leveraging doc­
trine fails to meet the first requirement because the attacked mo­
nopolist admittedly does not possess monopoly power in the 
relevant leveraged market. The Supreme Court has also defined 
the necessary elements for an attempt claim. Unlike straight mo­
nopolization which only requires that the actor have the intent to 
perform the act which results in monopolization, "attempt" claims 
require that the actor have a "'specific intent' to accomplish the 
forbidden objective."217 This accepted rule218 establishes a more 
difficult hurdle for attempt claims because the market itself has not 
yet been monopolized. The courts therefore focus more closely 
upon the actor's conduct to find the violation rather than focusing 
solely on market impact. To view monopoly leveraging as a species 
212. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. 
213. 15 U.S.c. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the relevant text of the statute, 
see supra note 4. 
214. See Robinson, supra note 210. 

As a matter of antitrust policy, such a conclusion [leveraging as an offense] is 

not difficult to accept; leveraging of monopoly power to gain an edge in a 

second market shares the vice of unlawful tying arrangements in that it in­

troduces an alien factor into the competitive milieu in the second market. But 

it is difficult to reconcile such a theory with the language of § 2, which con­

demns only monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monop­
olize any part of commerce .... 
[d. at 9 n.61. 
215. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1233. 
216. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2089 
(1992); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
217. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985). 
218. See, e.g., id.; Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375,396 (1905). 
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of an attempt claim merely places the relaxed requirements219 of 
leveraging claims sharply at odds with the heightened standard pro­
vided for attempt claims. 
Since the Berkey Photo opinion, a number of courts have ad­
dressed the issue of monopoly leveraging as a distinct offense under 
section 2.220 Because the Berkey Photo discussion of section 2 was 
general in nature, one court has suggested that this indicated the 
Berkey Photo court's desire to create a new offense,221 and that if 
the Berkey Photo court had meant for leveraging to fall within one 
of the existing groups it would have examined those traditional of­
fenses more carefully.222 More recently, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit discussed monopoly leveraging under the rubric 
of an "attempt" claim, suggesting that it was merely a variation of 
existing doctrine.223 Other courts' determinations have not been 
dispositive of the issue and leave doubt as to whether leveraging 
should be considered a new section 2 offense.224 The Berkey Photo 
court's failure to specify the approach it took towards monopoly 
leveraging leaves open the question of what must be proved to 
make out a successful claim.225 
219. See Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 
1985). For a list of the requirements, see supra note 123. 
220. See infra notes 223-27 and accompanying text. 
221. Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 571 F. Supp. 1504, 1516 
(E.D. Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 474 U.S. lI03 (1986). The court stated: 
The [Berkey Photo] court evinces from its discussion a general rule regarding 
the legal limitation on monopoly power, and announces that that rule is vio­
lated any time monopoly power is used to gain a competitive advantage. This 
analytical process clearly speaks to the purpose of the statute itself rather than 
the limits and possibilities of any pre-existing statutory offense, and thus seems 
to be describing a new and different way of proceeding under the Act-that is, 
a new [s]ection 2 offense. 
[d. 
222. [d. 
223. ·Thin Lab., Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1990). 
224. See Kerasotes Mich. Theatres, Inc. v. National Amusements, Inc., 854 F.2d 
135, 137-38 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom. G.K.c. Mich. Theatres v. National 
Amusements, Inc., 490 U.S. 1087 (1989), where the court noted that the plaintiffs had 
made out a satisfactory "leveraging" claim. The court, however, failed to indicate 
whether this was a separate offense or merely a species of offense. See also Grand 
Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 681 (2d Cir. 1985). Although the 
court outlined the elements for a leveraging claim based upon its Second Circuit prede­
cessor, Berkey Photo, the court did not clearly indicate whether leveraging was a dis­
tinct offense. Id. 
225. Grason Electric, 571 F. Supp. ·at 1516. The court suggested that leaving the 
determination ambiguous creates as many problems as it solves. Leveraging leaves 
open the question of what the defendant is charged with and what elements need to be 
proven to secure a conviction. Id. 
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Some courts have assumed that monopoly leveraging is a dis­
tinct offense.226 Conversely, other courts have placed leveraging 
under the existing "attempt to monopolize" category of section 2.227 
The cases have split rather evenly on the issue. An examination of 
the cases reveals that generally those viewing the doctrine favorably 
either do not discuss the issue or place it in an existing category.228 
Conversely, those cases with a more skeptical view toward leverag­
ing approach the doctrine as creating a new and distinct offense 
under section 2.229 Several possible explanations exist for this 
polarity. 
Perhaps the Berkey Photo court recognized that the leveraging 
doctrine would gain more widespread acceptance if it appeared to 
fall within one of the traditional monopoly categories. Other courts 
that eventually followed the doctrine may have also taken this posi­
tion as a means of more easily defending their theoretical positions. 
On the other hand, courts opposed to the monopoly leveraging 
doctrine are inclined to make it appear more divergent from the 
expressly stated offenses. A court which found the leveraging doc­
trine unacceptable on theoretical grounds could argue that leverag­
ing creates a new offense in an attempt to fortify its position. 
Consequently, a court which disagreed with Berkey Photo would 
have an initial argument that serves to weaken the doctrine, prior to 
asserting other more substantive arguments. The Ninth Circuit's 
primary arguments for rejecting monopoly leveraging in Alaska 
Airlines centered around a reversion back to enumerated offenses, 
226. See Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women v. NCAA, 735 F.2d 
577 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Here, the court stated "[a]ssuming arguendo that leveraging is a 
distinct section 2 offense." Id. at 586. This indicates that the court may have viewed 
leveraging as a separate offense. See also Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford 
Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990). In language similar to that used in 
NCAA the court observed "we assume that monopoly leveraging is an independent § 2 
violation separate from monopolization and attempted monopolization." Id. at 149 
n.17. This indicates that the court desired to address leveraging as a distinct violation. 
227. See Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990). 
The court addressed monopoly leveraging under the heading of "Monopoly Leveraging 
as an Attempt to Monopolize." Id. at 1566. The court noted that monopoly leveraging 
merged into attempt. This theory appears to be a misinterpretation by the court of pure 
leveraging. But see M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 691 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1982). In 
mentioning the possible claims for monopoly the court said, "[a]mong those forms is the 
theory that a firm violates § 2 by using its monopoly power in one market to gain an 
unwarranted competitive advantage in another." Id. at 1305-06. The court did not ex­
plicitly state that leveraging was a separate offense and proceeded more as if it fell 
within a traditional category. 
228. See supra notes 224 & 227. 
229. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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making it extremely effective to categorize leveraging as a distinct 
offense that wandered outside traditional boundaries.230 The 
Alaska Airlines court correctly focused on the parameters of the 
traditional offenses under section 2. 
The stringent requirements for attempt to monopolize claims 
preclude leveraging from falling within this traditional category.231 
Furthermore, under the strictest interpretation, leveraging also 
does not appear to meet both elements of a straight monopolization 
claim. The broad language in United States v. Griffith indicates that 
any use of monopoly power "to gain a competitive advantage ... is 
unlawful."232 However, when this language is read in the context of 
a necessity for monopoly power in the relevant market,233 the pos­
sibilities for fitting leveraging into a section 2 offense are con­
stricted. Without a clear niche, monopoly leveraging falls into a 
new category of offense and should therefore be rejected. Conse­
quently, the Alaska Airlines court adopted the correct approach in 
relying upon the more traditional offenses. Even with the broad 
language of Griffith,234 the Berkey Photo leveraging doctrine fails 
to satisfy anyone traditional offense. Congress did not intend to 
allow the judiciary to create offenses outside the traditional ones. 
C. What Does Monopoly Mean? 
Finding a niche for leveraging in the statutory scheme is a diffi­
cult task. If leveraging is viewed as a monopoly (as opposed to an 
attempt) offense, interpretational difficulties still arise. The Sher­
man Act and its legislative history provide minimal guidance in de­
termining what actions should constitute monopoly. The plain 
language of the statute uses only the generic term "monopoly."235 
During Senate consideration, Senator George Edmunds of Ver­
mont read from the Webster's dictionary on the definition of "mo­
nopoly."236 This discussion directly followed the interchange on 
230. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d, 536, 548 (9th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). The court retreated into § 2 offenses saying 
"[t]hus, the elements for ... 'monopolization' and 'attempted monopolization' are vital 
to differentiate between efficient and natural monopolies on the one hand, and unlaw­
ful monopolies on the other." Id. 
231. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
232. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). 
233. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
234. See Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1253 (noting that Berkey Photo was based 
upon Griffith). 
235. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). For the relevant text of the statute, 
see supra note 4. 
236. 21 CONGo REC. 3152 (1890), reprinted in KINTNER, supra note 1, at 293-94. 
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efficient and natural monopolies.237 Viewed as a whole, this in­
terchange indicates the Senators knew "monopoly" was something 
beyond the dictionary definition and needed development in the 
courts. 
The United States Supreme Court has established the require­
ment of "exclusionary" or "predatory" conduct for a finding of mo­
nopoly under the Sherman Act.238 In United States v. E.!. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. ,239 the Court defined monopoly power as the 
"power to control prices or exclude competition," reinforcing the 
requirement of exclusionary conduct.240 The monopolist, then, 
must engage in conduct that is clearly anti-competitive in addition 
to possessing monopoly power in the relevant market to complete 
the violation. Setting "exclusionary" conduct as the boundary cre­
ates the correct amount of protection for the large integrated com­
pany that competes in many markets. It recognizes the difference 
between conduct based upon efficiency and that based upon unlaw­
ful activity. This relatively strict standard provides the proper bal­
ance and insures that innocent competitors will not fall prey to 
broadly construed standards. 
Applying the stricter standard described above, it is apparent 
that the Alaska Airlines court had the better approach to leverag­
ing. The Berkey Photo court prohibited the "wielding" or "exer­
cise" of monopoly power even when that power was legitimately 
acquired.241 Judge Kaufman asserted that only those activities 
which are performed by a monopolist would be subject to liabil­
ity.242 At least one commentator, however, has criticized this asser­
tion contending that it creates an undesirable gray area of 
The dictionary definition given in the Senate was "2. To engross or obtain by any means 
the exclusive right of, especially the right of trading to any place, or with any country or 
district; as, to monopolize the India or Levant trade." [d. at 293. 
237. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
238. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
602 (1985). 
239. 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). 
240. [d. 
241. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
242. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093. The court noted: 
A classic illustration is an insistence that those who wish to secure a firm's 
services cease dealing with its competitors .... Such conduct is illegal when 
taken by a monopolist because it tends to destroy competition, although in the 
hands of a smaller market participant it might be considered harmless, or even 
"honestly industrial." 
[d. at 275. 
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interpretation.243 The strongest arguments presented by the Ninth 
Circuit addressed the rather loose requirements for anti-competi­
tive conduct offered in Berkey Photo. The Alaska Airlines court 
attacked the differences between Berkey's "exercise" of monopoly 
power and traditional "predatory" requirements.244 The Berkey 
243. See Robinson, supra note 210. 
While [exercise of monopoly power] is not specifically addressed by Judge 
Kaufman, the whole thrust of his opinion seemingly requires a showing that 
monopoly power has been used in order for a lawful monopolist to be gUilty of 
the offense of monopolization. On the other hand, the court at least leaves 
open the question of whether a monopolist "monopolizes" if he engages in 
false advertising to the detriment of his competitors-an act that obviously 
can be, and typically is, committed by companies lacking monopoly power. At 
another point the opinion indicates that a monopolist does not run afoul of § 2 
simply by advertising his products "unless the extent of this activity is so un­
warranted by competitive exigencies as to constitute an entry barrier." Since 
advertising by a large company that does not enjoy monopoly power can also 
erect barriers to entry, does this suggest that Judge Kaufman does not neces­
sarily regard the use of monopoly power as an essential element in every mo­
nopolization case? Does he perhaps intend to apply a rule of anticompetitive 
use as the index of illegality only in a "leveraging" case such as Berkey where 
the claim is that the monopolist used his monopoly power in one market in 
order to gain a competitive advantage in another? 
[d. at 11 n.64 (citations omitted). 
244. In exploiting the perceived weaknesses in the Berkey Photo opinion, the 
Ninth Circuit quoted Berkey Photo's defense of high prices as not constituting anti­
competitive behavior. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 549 
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). Unlike the Berkey Photo court, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that monopoly leveraging, like setting high prices, is just one of the 
societal "cost[s] that we incur" by permitting monopolies to exist. [d. at 548. The syllo­
gism proceeds as follows: The externalities associated with monopoly, like setting high 
prices, are acceptable; Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275, monopoly leveraging is also one 
of these externalities; therefore monopoly leveraging is acceptable. The court finished 
the analysis by applying the same rationale for allowing high prices (incentive for new 
competitors to enter the market because the buyers are discontented). Alaska Airlines, 
948 F.2d at 548-49. The court stated: "Every time the monopolist asserts its market 
dominance on a firm in the leveraged market, the leveraged firm has more incentive to 
find an alternative supplier, which in tum gives alternate suppliers more reason to think 
that they can compete with the monopolist." [d. at 549. But see, Sullivan, supra note 
187, at 1237 ("Consumers in a monopolized market can observe the problem they face; 
consumers in a competitively structured market into which a monopolist leverages 
power cannot.") Of course this syllogism is only possible "in the absence of any mean­
ingful, substantive distinction between monopoly leveraging and other consequences of 
lawful monopoly." Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 549. On the other hand, the Berkey 
court agreed that high prices "invite[d] new competitors into the monopolized market" 
but felt that leveraging was "an exercise of power over the market" as opposed to a 
mere "consequence of size." Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274-75 & n.12. It has been 
suggested that leveraging would be much easier to control than monopoly pricing be­
cause injunctions would provide the proper relief. See Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1237. 
To forbid leveraging does not present the severe problem of judicial adminis­
tration that would arise if a court were to enjoin monopoly pricing. Courts can 
readily control leveraging through equitable relief and effectively deter lever­
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Photo court, however, remarked that certain benefits "are a conse­
quence of size and not an exercise of power over the market,"245 
indicating a realization that efficiency had long been recognized as 
one of the safe harbors of the Sherman Act. The Berkey Photo 
approach could be read to establish a presumption that the leverag­
ing conduct is improper.246 A competitor could then rebut this pre­
sumption by a showing of efficiency. For this theory to work, one 
must believe that monopoly is "'inherently evil' "247 and any use 
thereof should be scrutinized.248 On the other hand, the Alaska 
Airlines court correctly utilized a presumption of propriety absent a 
aging by treble damages or criminal sanctions. . .. Courts hesitate to forbid 
conventional limit pricing due to problems in identifying and controlling it, 
and also because limit pricing forces the monopolist to give up some of its 
present "monopoly rents" in order to lengthen its tenure as a monopolist. 
However, none of these constraints applies to leveraging. 
[d. Absent "predatory" conduct, however, ease of control does not necessarily justify 
granting relief. One must remember that the logical structure of the syllogism collapses 
instantly absent a strong similarity between leveraging and other uses of monopoly 
power. 
Once again, the Berkey Photo view, drawing a distinction between pricing and 
leveraging, appears rooted in what the court saw as the parallel to tying cases. Berkey 
Photo, 603 F.2d at 275-76. Tying had been condemned by the Supreme Court as being 
unlawful per se. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. 
2072,2079 (1992); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). Conversely, 
the Ninth Circuit viewed leveraging solely in its § 2 context allowing the court to con­
clude (through the syllogism) that it was merely another permissible use of monopoly 
power. Copperweld's language seems to suggest that this approach was more faithful to 
the spirit of the divided sections of the Sherman Act although the policy arguments 
from Berkey Photo certainly are tenable. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Thbe 
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984). The strict interpretation seems more sound in light of 
the Act's emphasis on separation and recent Supreme Court precedent, although the 
Ninth Circuit could be seen as elevating form over substance. 
245. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274. 
246. [d. at 276. 
247. [d. at 273 (quoting United States v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. 
Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954». "Since monop­
oly power itself is the target of § 2, it is unreasonable to suggest that a firm that pos­
sesses such power in one [market] and uses it to damage competition in another market 
does not 'monopolize' within the meaning of the statute." [d. at 276 n.15. 
248. For a discussion of an opinion critical toward the practice of leveraging, see 
Lawrence A. Sullivan & Anne I. Jones, Monopoly Conduct, Especially Leveraging 
Power from One Product Market to Another in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPET· 
ITIVENESS 165 (Thomas Jorde & David Teece eds. 1992). "When a firm leverages power 
held in one market into a different market, the initial inference ought to be that unrea­
sonably restrictive and exploitive consequences will result." [d. at 174. But see, Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 
(1984). "No practice a manufacturer uses to distribute its products should be a subject 
of serious antitrust attention. . .. It should make no difference whether the manufac­
turer 'ties' products together in a bundle, employs full-line forcing or exclusivity 
clauses, or uses reciprocity." [d. 
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finding of "predatory" conduct.249 
Berkey Photo also suggests a unique standard for judging con­
duct in a two market situation. When evaluating such a case, the 
Berkey Photo court required that competition be "merely dis­
torted,"250 a requirement clearly less stringent than any discussed 
above. The Berkey Photo court reinforced its desire to place extra 
restraint upon the holder of a monopoly, even if lawfully acquired. 
Although Judge Kaufman provided a disclaimer to this rule for the 
competitor who uses "efficient size,"251 the Ninth Circuit noted that 
this gave little solace to the large and efficient competitor.252 Be­
cause a competitor has a lawful monopoly in one market, it should 
not be held to a higher standard in another, related market.253 
Furthermore, the alleged monopolist's situation should be evalu­
ated considering each market separately. If not, integrated compet­
itors have a greater chance of suffering254 because they reach many 
different markets and under the Berkey Photo rule their efficiency 
could actually be a Sherman Act violation. 
The legislative history of the Sherman Act and subsequent case 
law indicate that the efficient monopolist should not be unduly bur­
dened,255 and therefore efficient monopolies should not be consid­
ered unlawful under sections 1 and 2. 
D. Effects of Image Technical Services 
Recently, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dealt 
with both section 1 and 2 claims. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Services, Inc. ,256 the Court shed more light on its position 
249. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 549 (9th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). 
250. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 275. 
251. One commentator has remarked that "from the 1992 vantage point, Berkey 
reads as a generally sound opinion well within the mainstream. It acknowledges the 
importance of efficiency, even by monopolists, but does not suppose that courts must 
trade everything else of value in the antitrust tradition to attain efficiency." Sullivan, 
supra note 187, at 1256. 
252. Alaska Airlines, 948 F.2d at 548. "The anticompetitive dangers that impli­
cate the Sherman Act are not present when a monopolist has a lawful monopoly in one 
market and uses its power to gain a competitive advantage in the second market." Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. (In re Air Passenger 
Computer Reservation Sys. Antitrust Litig.), 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1475 (C.D. Cal. 1988). 
"Monopoly leveraging is overly restrictive because it attacks unilateral conduct which 
does not threaten monopolization. The danger is that such scrutiny will inhibit verti­
cally integrated firms from vigorously competing in complementary markets." Id. 
255. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
256. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). 
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towards monopolies, possibly helping to resolve the conflict be­
tween Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines. Although "leveraging" 
was not raised specifically at the Supreme Court level,257 the Court 
discussed some of the rules on monopoly power. The Supreme 
Court relied upon the "willful acquisition or maintenance"258 re­
quirement of Grinnell to disallow Kodak's motion for summary 
judgment. Furthermore, the court held that there was evidence 
"that Kodak took exclusionary action ... and used its control over 
parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the Kodak service mar­
ket."259 Unlike Berkey Photo and Alaska Airlines where the plain­
tiffs admitted that the defendants lacked monopoly power in the 
second market,260 the Supreme Court indicated here that Kodak al­
ready had a "monopoly share" in the second market.261 The court 
did not approach this as a monopoly leveraging case. Instead, the 
court viewed this as a case of Kodak possessing monopoly power in 
two separate markets.262 If anything, this decision serves to rein­
force the guidelines established in earlier cases263 by relying upon 
the traditional offense format. It also demonstrates that the Ninth 
257. Id. At trial, the district court held that leveraging was not a "legally valid" 
doctrine within the Ninth Circuit. The court further proclaimed that "plaintiffs have 
not come forward with any facts to suggest that Kodak had attempted to leverage 
power in that [service] market to gain a competitive advantage in another market." 
Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. C-87-1686-WWS, 1988 WL 
156332, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1990). The Ninth Circuit failed to deal with the lever­
aging issue saying "[c]ertainly the focus of appellants' Section 2 claim has changed on 
appeal." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc, 903 F.2d 612, 619-20 & n.7 
(9th Cir. 1990); see DiResta et aI., supra note 123, at 78-79 (examining this case, the 
authors stated that "[w]ith respect to the monopolization claims, the Ninth Circuit ig­
nored the monopoly leveraging theory and analyzed the claims of Kodak's refusal to 
deal as a monopolization or attempted monopolization."). 
258. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2090. 
259. Id. at 2091. As opposed to the display biasing in Alaska Airlines, the con­
duct on Kodak's part in this case seems much more culpable. Kodak sold and serviced 
their own brands of copier with their own parts which fit only their copiers. Certain 
Independent Service Organizations (ISO) began competing with Kodak in the copier 
servicing aftermarket. As a result, Kodak adopted a policy of knowingly refusing to sell 
replacement parts to ISOs. Image Technical Servs., 903 F.2d at 614. These policies are 
more obviously exclusionary than the mere distortion presented in Alaska Airlines. 
260. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 
F.2d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1603 (1992). 
261. Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2091. 
262. "Respondents' evidence that Kodak controls nearly 100% of the parts mar­
ket and 80% to 95% of the service market, with no readily available substitutes, is, 
however, sufficient to survive summary judgment under the more stringent monopoly 
standard of § 2." Image Technical Servs., 112 S. Ct. at 2090. 
263. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 
(1985); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). 
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Circuit's terse dismissal of Griffith might have been misplaced as 
the Supreme Court still relied upon Griffith's supposedly broad lan­
guage. However, the Supreme Court was not truly called upon to 
apply the Griffith language to its fullest because the conduct in 
question was clearly anticompetitive. 
CONCLUSION 
Monopoly leveraging has been viewed as both a Sherman Act 
section 2 offense and beyond the scope of the Sherman Act. Both 
approaches to monopoly leveraging are relatively sound, but they 
are separated by a vast difference of opinion regarding monopoly 
power in general. However, in light of recent Supreme Court pro­
nouncements, monopoly leveraging cannot correctly be considered 
a violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
The Alaska Airlines court noted that a certain amount of mo­
nopoly power was acceptable and indeed desirable to maintain effi­
ciency. The Berkey Photo court, to the contrary, believed that 
monopoly was inherently "undesirable" and should only be allowed 
to exist when it was built upon efficiency. This initial difference 
molded the shape of the two opinions. The Alaska Airlines court 
focused correctly upon the inherent differences between the first 
two sections of the Sherman Act. The plain language of the Sher­
man Act indicates that the touchstone of section 2 conduct should 
be monopoly power, or a dangerous probability, in the relevant 
market. Leveraging fails to clearly recognize this market power re­
quirement. Furthermore, if leveraging is viewed as a completely 
new offense, it oversteps the three offense format created by Con­
gress. Although leveraging may seem sound as a matter of policy, it 
does not distinguish sharply enough between lawful and unlawful 
monopoly. The correct approach to monopoly requires power in 
the relevant market and a "predatory" use of that power. The 
Alaska Airlines court correctly noted that these requirements are 
necessary to avoid wrongfully punishing the efficient competitor 
and unnecessarily shielding the inefficient competitor. 
James P. Puhala III 
